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Abstract 
Increasingly, national and international governments have a strong mandate to develop national e-
health systems to enable delivery of much-needed healthcare services.  Research is, therefore, needed 
into appropriate security and reliance structures for the development of health information systems 
which must be compliant with governmental and alike obligations.  The protection of e-health 
information security is critical to the successful implementation of any e-health initiative.  To address 
this, this paper proposes a security architecture for index-based e-health environments, according to 
the broad outline of Australia’s National E-health Strategy and National E-health Transition 
Authority (NEHTA)’s Connectivity Architecture.  This proposal, however, could be equally applied to 
any distributed, index-based health information system involving referencing to disparate health 
information systems.  The practicality of the proposed security architecture is supported through an 
experimental demonstration. This successful prototype completion demonstrates the comprehensibility 
of the proposed architecture, and the clarity and feasibility of system specifications, in enabling ready 
development of such a system.  This test vehicle has also indicated a number of parameters that need 
to be considered in any national indexed-based e-health system design with reasonable levels of 
system security.  This paper has identified the need for evaluation of the levels of education, training, 
and expertise required to create such a system. 
Keywords: indexed-based e-health systems, security architecture for health information systems, test 
vehicle. 
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 1 INTRODUCTION 
Numerous countries across the globe have national e-health initiatives at some stage of investigation 
or implementation.  Nations such as Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, 
Canada, the United States, and Singapore are active in e-health initiatives.  Normally, a national e-
health system relies on indexing services to determine the locations of a patient’s health records.  
Indexing services therefore play a central role in enabling disparate health records to become 
accessible across multiple repositories.  Australia’s National E-health Strategy (2008) also 
acknowledges that a central indexing or addressing mechanism is needed to link related health records 
which may reside in one or more locations.  Moreover, the security, control and management of these 
indexing systems are subject to emerging and strict governance imperatives.  This paper outlines three 
national index-based e-health initiatives from Australia, Canada, and Germany, and compares to the 
authors’ approach.   
In order to address the requirements for enhanced security in national e-health systems, a security 
architecture for index-based e-health environments is proposed.  This architecture is based on the 
broad outline of the Australian Government’s National E-health Strategy (2008) and National E-
health Transition Authority (NEHTA)’s Connectivity Architecture (2010).1  This proposal, however, 
could be equally applied to any distributed, index-based health information system involving 
referencing to other and disparate health information systems. 
This paper assesses the feasibility and comprehensibility of the proposed architecture through the 
implementation of a small test vehicle.  The practicality of the proposed security architecture is 
demonstrated through the implementation of this test vehicle.  This research elucidates a logic process 
model with functional specifications to be used as development guidelines and functional assessment 
for conforming implementations. 
Section 2 reviews three national index-based e-health initiatives and identifies the relationship of their 
strategies to the authors’ approach.  Section 3 reports on the test vehicle background which is based 
on our previous work.  The purpose, scope, and selection of software development tool sets of this test 
vehicle are detailed in Section 4.  Section 5 lists the structure of the test vehicle with logic process 
modules and provides a description of one exemplary functional requirement specification.  Section 6 
uses two scenarios to illustrate the key information flows within the implementation of the test 
vehicle.  An analysis of the test vehicle implementation is presented in Section 7.  Finally, our 
conclusion is presented and suggestions are made for further research. 
2 RELATED WORK 
Numerous countries across the globe have a national e-health initiative at some stage of investigation 
or implementation.  This section outlines three national index-based e-health architectures and 
identifies the relationship of their strategies to the authors’ approach.   
2.1 Australia’s National E-health Strategy 
Australia’s national e-health approach adopts a concept of a distributed Individual Electronic Health 
Record (IEHR) which is expected to be developed across geographic regions, according to the 
strategic directions specified in the Australian Government’s National E-Health Strategy (2008).  
IEHR has been referred to as the Personally-Controlled Electronic Health Record (PCEHR) by the 
Australian Government (Morris 2011).  The PCEHR system intends to contain summarised patient 
health information which aggregates the health records coming from original health information into 
integrated records across multiple locations.  Australia’s national e-health strategy also acknowledges 
that a central indexing or addressing mechanism is needed to link related health records which may 
                                              
1 NEHTA was established to accelerate the adoption and progression of e-health in Australia in 2005. 
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 reside in one or more locations.  NEHTA provides a design and implementation guide on Endpoint 
Location Service (ELS) (2009) for indexing purposes. 
Significantly, the protection of e-health information security plays a critical role in the success of any 
e-health implementation (National E-health Transition Authority 2008a).  In response to this concern, 
this paper proposes a security architecture for index-based e-health environments, based on the broad 
outline of Australia’s National E-health Strategy (2008a), NEHTA’s Connectivity Architecture 
(2008b), and NEHTA’s ELS Implementation Guide (2009).  The proposed architecture demonstrates 
a logic model for indexing and supports secure communications between healthcare providers and the 
Index System (Sections 5 and 6).   
2.2 Canadian Electronic Health Record (EHR) Solution 
Canada’s national e-health architecture, outlined in the Electronic Health Record Solution (EHRS) 
Blueprint (Canada Health Infoway 2006, 2008), comprises all subsets of jurisdictional EHR systems.  
Each jurisdictional EHR system consists of integrated and cross-referenced health data replicated 
from source data systems.  Canada’s EHRS Blueprint is a highly cross-referencing and index-based 
scheme linking relevant health records located at various registries and repositories.  With Canada’s 
EHR approach, each participating healthcare entity interacts with the jurisdictional EHR system via a 
message broker called the Health Information Access Layer (HIAL) to upload and retrieve shared 
health data from the EHR system.   
The HIAL element is part of Canada’s EHR Infostructure (Canada Health Infoway 2006, 2008), 
acting as a gateway to provide a collection of services between the EHR services and participating 
healthcare systems.  The technology infrastructure of HIAL exists "in the cloud," and does not reside 
at the healthcare entity’s end.  This is in contrast to the proposed Healthcare Interface Processor (HIP) 
facility.  Namely, this research uses a HIP facility which resides at each participating healthcare site to 
provide a secure communication channel for an untrusted health information system connected to the 
main Index System.  In addition, the proposed HIP facility acts as an interface/gateway for a 
healthcare provider’s system to connect to other health information systems to exchange health 
information in a secure and reliable manner.       
2.3 German National E-health Project 
The architecture of the German national e-health project, Telematics (Blobel & Pharow 2007; Jürjens 
& Rumm 2008), comprises three major components:  
(1) Local health systems connected to the national e-health platform (bIT4Health) for accessing 
central services of the Telematics infrastructure through a gateway interface, bIT4Health 
Connector.  The Connector, a hardware-based facility or integrated software with an information 
system, is installed at the local health system site to enable semantic interoperability and to 
provide data security services;  
(2) The central Telematics platform provides three subsystems: (i) Generic Common Services; (ii) 
Common Services; and (iii) Security Services.  The Security Services subsystem of interest to this 
research is needed to access shared health data, such as authentication, authorisation, the signature 
timestamp, and access logging; and 
(3) The backend system, which provides a set of resource providers to manage accessible data stores 
and external services. 
The design of the bIT4Health Connector and the proposed HIP facility share the following basic 
features: 
 Both are installed at the local health system site; and  
 Both act as a gateway/interface between the central service system and the local health system for 
the provisioning of semantic interoperability.  
In contrast, the major differences between the bIT4Health Connector and the proposed HIP facility 
are as follows: 
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  The HIP facility builds on a trusted system to provide a resilient platform to carry out its tasks 
from Layers 1 to 7 of the seven-layer OSI model; and 
 HIP not only intends to enable semantic interoperability for healthcare information exchange, but 
also provides critical security services, including presenting a trusted path to the national e-health 
infrastructure, mutual authentication, data protection, accountability, and operational flexibility 
with an emergency override function.   
3 TEST VEHICLE BACKGROUND 
To access an individual’s health records from disparate sources, health record indexing services 
provide lookup services for finding the source locations of health information, and even for the 
connection requirements for accessing the repository of health data.  In our previous paper (Liu et al. 
2010), we proposed a secure architecture for an index based e-health environment based on the 
strategic directions from the Australian Government’s National E-health Strategy (2008), and 
NEHTA’s proposed Connectivity Architecture (2008b) and ELS (2009).  Figure 1 illustrates the 
proposed connectivity architecture with the required structures to support secure communications in 
the national e-health environment, including: (i) The Index System itself; and (ii) the proposed 
Healthcare Interface Processor (HIP) facility.   
 
Figure 1.  A Secure Architecture for Index-Based E-health Environments 
The Index System, a centralised facility run at a national level, should be built on a high-trust 
computer platform to perform authentication and indexing services.  The design rationale underlying 
HIP, a resilient and qualified facility built on top of a trusted base-embedded hardware and software 
platform, is to act as a proxy server to establish a secured communication channel connecting to the 
Index System and for health information exchange between healthcare providers.  This design could 
isolate a potentially hostile or compromising system connected to the national e-health network. 
Wherever a connection to the national indexing system is required, a HIP facility has to exist in some 
form. 
Generally, health information is stored across a number of different health information systems.  A 
national Index System must be available for the provision of directory services to determine the 
distributed locations of the source systems holding the related health records.  This architectural 
model draws on important lessons from the Internet’s Domain Name System (DNS).2  This approach 
embraces the hierarchical and distributed nature of DNS, and defines the required components for a 
secure architectural design in a national e-health scheme.  This architecture also mandates that 
participating healthcare providers need to adopt a high-trust interface module, the proposed HIP, as 
the application proxy to connect to the Index System, as well as to link to other health information 
systems. 
A first point of contact in any Index System must itself be verified for authenticity and integrity.  In 
Internet terms, the client system must be certain that it is connected to the correct Index System and 
                                              
2 RFC 1034 provides an introduction to the DNS functions and protocol for standard data and query types. 
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 not to some fraudulent system or via some intermediate node point capable of monitoring all traffic.  
A fundamental security issue must therefore be addressed, viz. the veracity of domain names.  Trusted 
domain name resolution services are a critical element in the overall trusted architecture of any index-
based healthcare system to combat attacks on the system, such as name resolution cache poisoning, 
and traffic diversion/monitoring attacks.  This security architecture not only provides an indexing 
service, but also incorporates a trusted name resolution scheme for the enforcement of security in 
communicating with the authorised Index System.   
This research concentrates on the Australian national e-health environment from a security 
perspective.  However, this proposed architecture could be equally applied to any distributed, 
indexed-based healthcare information system involving referencing of disparate health data 
collections or repositories.   
4 IMPLEMENTATION DECISION 
This section describes the purpose and scope of the development of the test vehicle, as well as the 
decision made as to the selection of software development tool sets. 
4.1 Purpose for the Prototype Development 
The primary objective of this implementation has been to determine the parameters needed for an 
appropriate evaluation of any index-based, e-health system project.  To date, our research has 
identified the normal and obvious parameters of the need for optimised performance, coupled with 
acceptable levels of system security.  In fact, this test vehicle indicates a number of additional 
parameters that need to be considered in any large-scale experimental design, including: 
 Clarity and comprehensibility of the overall  architecture and allied specifications to enable ready 
development of prototype systems; 
 The need for evaluation of the level of education, training and expertise required by ICT 
professionals to create and manage such systems; and 
 Determination of the guidelines for the creation and assessment of experimental information 
systems and the associated configurations chosen for the development of such systems. 
These three parameters have been readily determined even though the experiment performed was of a 
minimal nature. 
4.2 Prototype Scope 
This proposed architecture concerns the development of a secure architecture design to facilitate 
patient information sharing and data collection via a national Index System.  For demonstration 
purposes, this paper describes a test environment that consists of a simulated single national Index 
System and three participating healthcare organisations. 
The national Index System in the test environment performs fundamental services, including 
authentication and directory services.  It provides basic authentication services to verify the identity 
and credentials of healthcare providers; nevertheless, the focus of this paper is to demonstrate the 
operation of the indexing services themselves.  For test reasons, we have used a conventional 
username/password authentication mechanism.  This module, however, will allow for the 
incorporation of token-based authentication mechanisms as required.  The experimental Index System 
will provide lookup index referencing to the healthcare service requesting-entity to locate the 
healthcare information stored at various locations.  The Index System facilitates the healthcare service 
entities in their need to deposit index references for patient records on the Index System.   
One healthcare service entity simulates a role of a service requesting-entity, referring as the entity that 
uses a service provided by another entity.  The other two healthcare entities act as service-providing 
entities that offer health information to another entity. 
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 4.3  Selection of Software Development Tool Sets 
Since open-source software has risen to great prominence, we have acquired software development 
tool sets for this prototype based on the concept of open-source technology development.  The 
particular software has been chosen against the contexts of reliability, sustainability, performance, 
efficiency, accessibility, security, portability, interoperability, total cost of ownership, and 
maintenance.  The selected software development tools are listed in Table 1: 
Web Services framework 
Data Access Connection Management (interface) JNDI 
Web Services Description Language (WSDL)
3
 converter Axis2 
Web Server Tomcat 
Programming language Java 
Database Management System (DBMS) Derby 
Operating System Ubuntu 
Table 1. Development Tool Set  
5 PROTOTYPE STRUCTURE 
Figure 2 illustrates that the prototype structure consists of one national Index System and three 
participating healthcare entities managing their own healthcare information systems.  The Index 
System is a centralised system run at a national level providing authentication and indexing services.  
Of the three healthcare service entities, one plays the role of a service-requesting entity, and the others 
act as service-providing entities. 
 
Figure 2.  Prototype Structure 
5.1 The Simulated Index System 
Generally, health information is stored over a number of various incompatible health information 
systems.  Indexing services must be available for the provision of directory services to maintain 
location information for the source systems holding the related health data.  The main functions of the 
Index System should include: (a) authentication services; and (b) publication and discovery healthcare 
to information services.  As various healthcare organisations may have their own specific access to 
authorisation requirements and processes, privilege management is performed by service providers 
locally. 
In the prototype, the Index System links to an authentication database and directory service 
repository.  The interface used to access the directory services of the Index System is a WSDL 
interface implementation.  The Index System is constructed on Ubuntu and deploys a Web Services 
stack including:  
 Tomcat Web Server, which acts as an enabling platform for the implementation of Axis2 and 
JNDI; 
                                              
3 WDSL is used to describe how to access network services in XML format. More detail is available at 
http://www.w3.org/TR/wsdl#_introduction, viewed 17/02/2010.  
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  Axis2, which acts as a Web Services engine for generating and implementing healthcare 
applications on a Web Services platform consistent with WSDL specifications; and 
 JNDI, which is deployed to manage data connections between the healthcare applications and the 
DBMS. 
For the technical implementation of directory services, each participating healthcare organisation in 
the national e-health scheme is required to submit its service locator information to the Index System.  
The submitted information includes the organisational healthcare provider identifier system Uniform 
Resource Locator (URL), and associated public key.  When a new patient record is created on the 
health information system, the health information system will send an index reference for the new 
patient record along with its organisational healthcare provider identifier to the Index System.  A 
lookup operation searches for any entry matched with a patient’s Individual Healthcare Identifier 
(IHI) and returns an aggregated list of service instances.  The aggregation list of service instances 
identifies the target system location and information necessary for service invocation.  From a 
database structure perspective, Figure 3 illustrates two exemplary tables and a view (virtual table) in 
the directory service database: (a) Service Location; (b) Index Reference for Patient Records; and (c) 
Service Instance View.   
The Service Instance View comprises the query results on the target systems which hold the identified 
patient’s health data aggregated from (a) and (b) above. 
 
Figure 3.  Example of Tables and View of the Directory Service Database 
The prototype implementation of the Index System consists of the following system processes to 
provide authentication, publication, and discovery for healthcare information services: 
 Service Locator Registration and Update;  
 Index Reference for Patient Records;   
 Acceptance of Lookup Query;    
 Authentication Operations; 
 Resolution of Lookup Query; and  
 Delivery Resolution for Lookup Query. 
A functional requirement specification provides a description of a particular system process, as well 
as identifies the data parameters to be entered into that system process.  Owing to paper-length 
limitations, the functional requirement specifications of the system processes listed above are not 
included in this paper but are available on request.   
5.2 Virtual Health Information Systems 
In general, participating healthcare organisations within a national e-health scheme may use disparate 
healthcare information systems across multiple platforms.  With this test environment, however, we 
set up the three healthcare organisations to deploy their own healthcare information systems based on 
the same open-source architecture and software.  The main reason for using the same structure for the 
three healthcare information systems in the test environment is that each participating healthcare 
organisation implements a consistent Web Services interface to support service provision and 
invocation; therefore, interoperability can still be achieved.  In the test environment, the health 
information system implements service provision and invocation in WSDL through support of Web 
Services interfaces.   
(a) Service Locator (b) Index Reference for Patient Records
(c) Service Instance View
HPI-O=Healthcare Provider Identifier - Organization IHI=Individual Healthcare Identifier
IHI HPI-O
IHI HPI-O HP Name System URL Public Key
HPI-O HP Name System URL Public Key
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 Each virtual healthcare information system resides on the Ubuntu operating system and deploys its 
own healthcare Web services framework, including: 
 Tomcat Web Server, which acts as an enabling platform for the implementation of Axis2 and 
JNDI; 
 Axis2, used as a convertor between Java classes and the WSDL format;  
 JNDI,  used to manage data connections; 
 Derby, deployed as the Database Management System; and 
 Java applications to invoke and/or provide healthcare services.  
A healthcare service entity can play two major roles: as a (i) healthcare service-requesting entity 
and/or a (ii) healthcare service-providing entity.  A service-requesting entity refers to the entity that 
uses a service provided by another entity.  A service-providing entity is an entity that offers a service 
used by another entity.  A service-providing entity can be a healthcare provider, healthcare 
organisation, or organisation commissioned to provide services for healthcare providers or healthcare 
organisations. 
In the prototype, the healthcare service-requesting system includes the following system processes: 
 Request for Service Locator Registration and Update;  
 New Patient Creation; 
 Lookup Query Handler;  
 Reception for Query Resolution; and 
 Service Invocation for Patient Data. 
The system processes of the healthcare service-providing system in the prototype include: 
 Reception for Patient Data Request;    
 Token Verification;   
 Authorisation Logic;   
 Retrieval of Patient Data  
 Response to Emergency Access Override; 
 Delivery of Requested Patient Data; and  
 Notification for Available Health Reports. 
Due to paper-length limitations, this paper can only provide an exemplary description of functional 
requirement specifications from one of the system processes listed above, Authorisation Logic.   
5.2.1 An Exemplary Description of Functional Requirement Specification – Authorisation Logic 
The purpose of this system process is to make an access decision upon a patient data request is 
received at the healthcare service-providing system.  The Reception for Patient Data Request process 
passes the authentication token to the Token Verification process to validate the authenticity of the 
token.  Upon successful token verification, then the requesting healthcare provider’s identifiers (i) 
HPI-O; (ii) HPI-I; and (iii) patient’s IHI are passed to the Access Authorisation process.  If the access 
is allowed, the Retrieval of Patient Data process retrieves the request data, or else the Authorisation 
Logic process produces an “access denied” message.   
Not only does the Authorisation Logic process carry the “Sensitivity Label” mechanism outlined by 
NEHTA (2008c), but also extends this with “inclusive access” and “exclusive access” provisions to 
support a finer level of granularity for consent.  NEHTA argues that it is necessary to have the 
“Sensitivity Label” function in place for health data.  This enables individuals and their healthcare 
providers to have the appropriate level of access allowable over sensitive health data.  NEHTA 
suggests two label categories: (i) “Clinical Care”, and (ii) “Privileged Care.”  The “Clinical Care” 
label normally refers to clinical information that may be accessed by all healthcare providers involved 
in the healthcare of the patient.  Health data labelled as “Privileged Care” can only be accessed by 
healthcare providers who have been nominated by the patient.  NEHTA’s approach uses a coarse 
granularity for consent.  This may not be sufficient to meet the situation where information access 
control needs to be enforced at a finer level of granularity, however.  In contrast, this research 
represents the following access rules, with the flow chart shown in Figure 4.   
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 The inclusive and exclusive access lists should be defined by patients in conjunction with advice from 
their healthcare providers when health information is created.  Normally, patients make decisions on 
who is allowed to access their health information.  Patients with reduced decision-making capacity 
may need to compromise some level of their health information privacy to receive the most effective 
health services.   
 
Figure 4.  Flow Chart for Authorisation Logic 
6 KEY INFORMATION FLOWS 
Scenario 1 shows how the proposed system carries out security measures, including authentication, 
confidentiality, integrity, access control, and transmission security.  Scenario 2 demonstrates how the 
proposed system provides the flexibility of having an emergency override function by switching to a 
defined emergency policy while activating audit trail functions. 
 Scenario 1: A new patient’s medical history enquiry; and 
 Scenario 2: Emergency override access.   
6.1 Enquiry for New Patient’s Medical History 
 
Figure 5.  Enquiry for New Patient’s Medical History 
A new patient, Peter, presents himself for the first time to a medical clinic “A” to seek medical 
attention.  The treating physician in the medical clinic A, David, needs to access Peter’s medical 
history to enable more effective and efficient diagnosis and treatment.  It is assumed that David has no 
prior knowledge that Peter’s medical history is located at medical clinics “B” and “C.”  In this case, 
the medical clinic A acts as a healthcare requesting entity.  “B” and “C” play a role as healthcare 
service-providing entities.  Peter’s medical data held at B is labelled “Clinical Care,” but Peter’s 
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 mental medical data held at C is labelled “Privileged Care.”  David queries the Index System for the 
source of Peter’s medical data.  Upon successful authentication, the Index System responds to the 
request with the source of medical history and signed token for service invocation.  David presents the 
authentication token to medical clinics B and C to request Peter’s medical data.  As a result, the 
medical clinic B provides the requested data.  The medical clinic C, however, declines the data 
request because David is not authorised to access Peter’s medical data labelled “Privileged Care.”   
Figure 5 illustrates the key information flows of the interactions between the healthcare requesting 
entity, Index System, and healthcare service-providing entities with the consequent steps.  Meanwhile, 
this illustration presents how the proposed system architecture can enable secure communications 
between healthcare providers and the Index System in the national e-health environment. 
Note that all request and response messages prior to transmission are signed and encrypted for 
confidentiality, authentication, and message integrity purposes.   
1 A New Patient Registration  
1.1 A new patient, Peter, is registered in A’s health information system. 
1.2 A’s health information system sends a request to enrol this new patient index to the master  
Index Reference for Patient Records on the Index System.   
1.3 Once index reference enrolment to Index Reference for Patient Records on the Index System 
is successful, the Index System sends an acknowledgement to A.    
2 Medical History Source Enquiry 
2.1 To be able to query the directory services, a requesting entity must be presented to the Index 
System with its identity and credentials, including Healthcare Provider Individual Identifier 
and the affiliated Healthcare Provider Organisational Identifier.  David logs onto the Index 
System with A’s HPI-O and David’s HPI-I.   
2.2 Upon successful authentication, David queries the source of Peter’s medical history. 
3 Resolution of Medical History Source Enquiry 
3.1 The Index System searches the master patient index references based on the entry matched to 
Peter’s IHI. 
3.2 There are two matched entries found in this case.  The Index System then responds with a 
signed token, coupled with the list of the service instance information for service invocation. 
4 Service Invocation 
4.1 David contacts B to request Peter’s medical history with the signed token and other necessary 
information for service invocation. 
4.2 David also contacts C to request Peter’s medical history with the signed token and other 
necessary information for service invocation.   
5 Service Provision from the Medical Clinic B  
5.1 B validates the signed token and request. 
5.2 Upon successful verification, B makes an access decision based on David’s profile against 
Peter’s medical data. 
5.3 Peter’s medical data held at B’s health information system is labelled as “Clinical Care”, so 
David’s access request is granted. 
5.4 The requested data is sent to David. 
6 Service Provision from the Medical Clinic C 
6.1 C validates the signed token and request. 
6.2 Upon successful verification, C makes an access decision based on David’s profile against 
Peter’s medical data. 
6.3 Peter’s medical data is labelled as “Privileged Care” at C’s health information system, but 
David’s is not on the “inclusive access” list to access Peter’s sensitive medical data, so 
David’s access request is declined.   
6.4 The request declined message is sent to David. 
6.2 Emergency Override Access   
There are some cases when medical data must be accessible even in the absence of authorised 
permission.  For example, if the authorised viewer of a patient’s case file is not present, but the patient 
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 requires emergency treatment, then the availability of the information is more important than its 
privacy.  The service-providing system is programmed to respond to the request for emergency 
access.   
Figure 6 shows the interactions between the healthcare-requesting entity, Index System, and 
healthcare service-providing entities in an emergency.  This illustration also justifies how the 
proposed system architecture provides the flexibility of having timely access to the requested data 
with an emergency override function while activating audit trail functions in such circumstances.   
 
Figure 6.  Emergency Override Access 
Note that all request and response messages prior to transmission are signed and encrypted for 
security purposes. 
1 Medical History Source Enquiry 
The emergency services attending physician queries the Index System for the source of the 
patient’s medical history with the physician’s identity and credentials and the patient’s IHI.   
2 Resolution of Medical History Source Enquiry 
The Index System searches the master patient index references based on the entry matched to the 
patient’s IHI.  The Index System then responds with a signed token coupled with the list of the 
service instance information for service invocation to the requesting entity. 
3 Service Invocation 
The service requesting entity presents the signed token to the healthcare service-providing entity 
for an emergency access to the patient’s medical history. 
4 Service Provision   
After the healthcare service-providing entity validates the signed token, the process moves into 
auditing mode without passing through the access decision-making process.  To improve privacy 
accountability and consumer trust through audit trails, the audit trail records who accessed the data 
and when the data was accessed.  The security administrator and patient should be notified of the 
detection of any unauthorised access.   
7 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This prototype project used approximately 288 hours of development effort.  This includes times for (i) 
understanding the architecture and system specifications; (ii) selecting development tool sets; (iii) 
coding, testing and debugging; and (iv) system documentation.  This prototype development was 
undertaken as a postgraduate student project by working 24 hours per week, completed over 12 weeks 
during one semester.  The prototype developer had three years of practical experience working within 
the IT industry as an application programmer familiar with Java, JSP, Tomcat, and Oracle database 
systems.  At the beginning of prototype development, to create the healthcare application integration 
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 structure based on Web Services, the developer had to self-educate on how to develop distributed 
Web-based applications using the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) 
4
 and WSDL specifications.   
Although this experiment has been performed in a minimal manner, the successful completion of this 
prototype demonstrates the comprehensibility of the proposed architecture as well as clarity and 
feasibility of system specifications for enabling ready development of such a system.  As 
demonstrated, to create such a prototype system does not require high levels of specialised system 
development expertise.   
This paper describes the technical aspects of the procedures involved in the development of the test 
vehicle for the proposed security architecture.  The result of this paper is useful for providing 
development guidelines and functional assessment for conforming implementations. This experiment 
has been to ensure that the system specifications may be readily understood and implemented within a 
reasonable timeframe and with modest resources.  Scalability issues, however, have been not 
addressed in this experiment. 
For the purpose of system analysis, the Australian Government’s National E-health Strategy (2008) 
Index Scheme proposal has been used as particular framework in the research undertaken.  This 
research, however, may be more generally applied to any distributed, indexed-based healthcare 
information systems involving index referencing of disparate health data collections. 
The implementation of DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC)
5
 (Arends et al. 2005a, 2005b, 2005c) has 
not been incorporated within the test environment, however.  For overall trust, DNSSEC would be 
assumed as a mandatory component to combat the recent increase in DNS cache poisoning and traffic 
diversion attacks.  It is assumed that the first step is to perform the enforcement of trusted 
communication to the authorised Index System prior to the interactions between the service-
requesting entity and the Index System.  To achieve this, from a technical underlying process, the 
health information system should be pre-configured to contact a DNSSEC-capable server to perform a 
trusted name resolution.  This enables the server to defend against false DNS data and to assure that 
connections are only established with the legitimate Index System. 
There is one master Index System and three participating healthcare service entities in the test 
environment.  The Index System is a centralised service implemented at a national level; however, it 
should be replicated for resilience purposes.  This resilient pattern can be seen in the hierarchical and 
distributed structure of the DNS.  
In this test environment, each healthcare service entity connects to the national e-health network 
system without using the proposed application proxy facility - HIP.  It is envisaged that HIP should be 
used to provide a secured communication channel for an untrusted health information system 
connected to the Index System, as well as for health information exchange between healthcare 
providers.  Wherever a connection to the national indexing system is required, a HIP facility has to 
exist.   
The authors argue that the load of the national Index System should be relatively lightweight to be 
able to perform e-health indexing services efficiently.  This can mitigate against Index System 
explosion and traffic bottleneck risks.  Such an approach is favourable in a geographically large 
country such as Australia.  To be scalable and to provide effective and efficient operation, the access 
control and authorisation process is best performed close to where the source system is.  This is 
because each healthcare service provider might implement the service differently based on its own 
health information system access requirements.  Additionally, this prototype system extends the 
“Sensitivity Label” mechanism outlined by NEHTA (2008c) with “inclusive access” and “exclusive 
                                              
4 SOAP, a platform-independent protocol, normally uses HTTP/HTTPS as the mechanisms for exchanging XML-based 
messages over networks. 
5 The DNSSEC, through use of Public Key Cryptography, enables DNS “zones” to “digitally sign” the necessary nameserver 
tables so that, on distribution, such tables can be checked for authenticity and integrity by the receiver. 
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 access” provisions to support fine-granular access control constraints.  Further experimentation would 
be valuable to elucidate requirements in other regimes and architectures.   
The United States’ Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 1966 was 
enacted to encourage a move towards electronic health information systems, while requiring 
safeguards to protect security and privacy.  The Resource Guide for Implementing the Health 
Insurance Portability Accountability Act (HIPAA) Security Rule (Hash et al. 2008) provides 
guidelines for the implementation of the technical safeguards specified in the HIPAA Security Rule. 
These guidelines cover access control, audit control, integrity, authentication, and transmission 
security.  This research meets all the requirements of the technical safeguards mentioned in this 
resource guide.  One of the access control management activities in this resource guide addresses 
implementation of the mandatory requirement to “establish an emergency access procedure.”  This 
research meets the requirement by providing the flexibility of having an emergency override function 
by switching to a defined emergency policy in such circumstances, while activating vigorous audit 
trail functions.  In addition, this research ensures that all information prior to transmission is digitally 
signed and encrypted for confidentiality, authentication, and message integrity.   
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The successful completion of this prototype development has achieved the following anticipated 
outcomes: 
 The proposed architecture is comprehensible and feasible to enable ready development of 
prototype systems; 
 The creation of such a prototype system does not require high levels of specialised system 
development expertise, assuming all cryptographic functions are provided;   
 The logic model outlined in this paper can be used as development guidelines and assessment for 
the functionality of conforming implementations; and 
 The proposed architecture has met all the requirements of the Resource Guide for Implementing 
the Health Insurance Portability Accountability Act (HIPAA) Security Rule (Hash et al. 2008). 
This prototype development was not aimed at performance and scalability testing of the proposed 
architecture.  Nevertheless, performance and scalability represent two factors that need to be carefully 
examined in the development and deployment of any e-health record system.  Such analysis is, 
however, out of the scope and resources of the current project and must be left to future work.  It is 
essential to test the scalability and performance of the proposed architecture against a high order of 
magnitude in health record infrastructure in the future. 
This prototype is developed under a general-purpose operating system that is a “Discretionary Access 
Control (DAC)” system.  It is intended that the system structure be migrated to a more secure 
platform supporting “Mandatory Access Control (MAC)”-type principles usual in a trusted operating 
system.  Since the indexing services and health information exchange are mission critical, the index 
system and health information systems must be protected from internal and external threats through 
the use of modern “Flexible Mandatory Access Control (FMAC)” structures.  Under such an 
operating system, and as distinct from the less secure DAC-based systems, even a system 
administrator may not have permission to access the health record data.  In these systems, there is no 
“super-user” capable of obtaining access to all system resources at any time.  If an individual 
subsystem is “captured,” propagation of exposure will not extend beyond the compromised subsystem 
itself, a vital concern in any e-health environment, including the “Labelled Security Protection Profile 
(LSPP)” of international standard ISO/IEC15408.  
Part of our future work is to build a HIP prototype.  The HIP prototype development is a non-trivial 
task, which requires sustained collective efforts to incorporate the prescribed provisions, including 
security, ease of use, flexibility, interoperability, and resilience features.  It is intended that such HIP 
development would involve the production of a number of laboratory prototypes and even the creation 
of a small production prototype run.  The proposed secure and resilient architecture for compliance in 
index-based e-health environments is therefore timely and critical at present.   
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